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We show that international outsourcing may reduce welfare of the outsourcing country by deterring 
market-entry, thus showing a new effect which is different from the employment and the quality effects 
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There have been great concerns that large number of job losses in the developed countries might occur 
as a result of international outsourcing of the unskilled and semi-skilled activities. There are also growing 
concerns about the effects on product quality of outsourcing. We identify a new source, viz., the 
competition effect, for policy concerns on international outsourcing. 
We show that international outsourcing may reduce welfare of the outsourcing country by deterring 
market-entry, thus showing a new effect which is different from the employment and the quality effects 
creating negative impacts of outsourcing. Entry deterrence under outsourcing reduces domestic welfare if 
both the profit extraction and cost saving from outsourcing are sufficiently small.   1
1. Introduction 
Outsourcing of productions from the USA to countries such as India, Brazil and 
China, has emerged as a popular topic of discussion both in the academia and the 
media. The impacts of outsourcing on employment and quality have been at the center 
of debate. There have been great concerns that large number of job losses in the 
developed countries might occur as a result of international outsourcing of the 
unskilled and semi-skilled activities, although recent studies have shown that, instead 
of outsourcing, recent job losses in the USA are primarily due to the rise in the 
manufacturing productivity (Schultze, 2004) and the structural transformation of the 
economy (Groshen and Potter, 2003). Even though negative employment effect need 
not be in place, there are growing concerns about the effects on product quality of 
outsourcing. For example, a recent survey by Manpower in the UK indicates that 56 
percent of IT specialist reports lower quality of IT works under international 
outsourcing than it is under in-house production, and that 11 percent reports that 
outsourcing sets back the firm’s production (see, 
http://www.manpower.co.uk/news/OutsourcingSurvey.pdf).  
We identify a new source, viz., the competition effect, for policy concerns on 
international outsourcing. We show that entry deterrence under outsourcing reduces 
welfare of the outsourcing country if both profit extraction and cost saving from 
outsourcing are sufficiently small. The negative impact of outsourcing becomes more 
prominent with a higher domestic consumption of the product. It is needless to say 
that our argument differs from both the employment and product-quality effects. An 
immediate implication of our result suggests that public policies designed to 
encourage market-entry deserves greater attention in the presence of international 
outsourcing.   2
Our paper complements the recently growing literature on international 
outsourcing. Grossman and Helpman (2002 and 2003), Egger and Egger (2003), Shy 
and Stenbacka (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) show contractual and strategic 
implications of outsourcing and the advantage of international outsourcing over other 
organizational structures such as vertical integration and foreign direct investment. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) estimate the impact of outsourcing on the relative wage 
within USA. Jones (2005) compares immigration and outsourcing since both tend to 
affect local wage. Pack and Saggi (2001) show the effects of knowledge spillover on 
the profitability of the outsourced firm. Glass and Saggi (2001), Sayek and Şener 
(2006) and Marjit and Mukherjee (2008a) show the implications of outsourcing on 
R&D. Marjit and Mukherjee (2008b) show that international outsourcing may reduce 
profits of the outsourced firms, and outsourcing may also be socially excessive. 
Stähler (2007) shows the trade-off between vertical foreign direct investment and 
outsourcing. In contrast to the above-mentioned papers, we emphasize the role of 
international outsourcing on the product-market structure, which has been overlooked 
in the existing literature.
1  
It is worth highlighting that, in our analysis, outsourcing helps to save the cost 
of entry by deterring entry, yet it may reduce welfare by creating higher market 
concentration. This is in contrast to the ‘excessive entry’ literature (e.g., Mankiw and 
Whinston, 1986; Anderson et al., 1995; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; and Mukherjee 
and Mukherjee, 2008) indicating that costly-entry in an imperfectly competitive 
market may be welfare-reducing.  
                                                 
1 Even if Pack and Saggi (2001) discusses the implications of entry, entry in their model is due to 
knowledge spillover in the foreign country and not because of international outsourcing per se. In 
contrast, there is no knowledge spillover in our analysis, and entry is affected by the outsourcing 
activity.   3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model. Section 3 summarizes the main results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Consider a world economy with two countries, a domestic country and a foreign 
country. There is an incumbent final goods producer (firm 1) and an entrant final 
goods producer (firm 2) in the domestic country. Production requires a critical input, 
and each of them can produce the critical input in the domestic country at the constant 
marginal cost,  0 > c . We assume that firm 2 needs to incur a fixed entry cost E , if it 
enters the market. 
We assume that firm 1 can outsource input production to the foreign country, 
where the inputs are produced by an input supplier at the constant marginal cost,d , 
which is lower than c. For simplicity, we assume that  0 = d . We further assume that, 
under outsourcing, the price of paid by firm 1 to acquire the inputs from the foreign 
input supplier is determined through a generalized Nash bargaining process, with α  
and  ) 1 ( α −  representing the respective bargaining power of firm 1 and the foreign 
input supplier.  
Final goods are sold in the domestic country and the inverse market demand 
function in the domestic country is: 
q a P − = ,       ( 1 )  
where P  is price, q is quantity, and  0 > > c a . 
  Since outsourcing by only firm 1 will be a crucial factor for our result, it is 
worth spending some time on this issue before going further. It is well documented 
that international outsourcing often involves significant costs (see, e.g., Glass and 
Saggi, 2001; Pack and Saggi, 2001; Grossman and Helpman, 2003). There are often   4
significant amount of hidden costs of outsourcing, such as the cost of selecting a 
vendor, the cost associated with the transition of work from the outsourced firm to the 
vendor (which involves, for example, the costs of training the overseas employees, the 
costs of building overseas infrastructures, etc.), the cost of layoffs in the outsourced 
firm, the costs of managing contracts and the cultural costs (Overby, 2003). It has also 
been shown that if the firms have the option for outsourcing and domestic production, 
the most productive firms do outsourcing (Mitra and Ranjan, 2008). Hence, assuming 
that the cost of outsourcing is asymmetric for firms 1 and 2, a sufficiently higher cost 
of outsourcing faced by firm 2 (compared to firm 1) makes outsourcing unprofitable 
for firm 2, yet outsourcing is profitable for  firm 1. These asymmetric costs of 
outsourcing may be the outcome of different organizational structures of the firms 
and/or lower efficiency of firm 2 compared to firm 1.
2 For simplicity, we normalize 
firm 1’s cost of outsourcing to zero.  
  It is also worth mentioning that the assumption of homogeneous products in 
our analysis abstracts away the quality effect. Further, the assumption of constant 
marginal costs, which implicitly assumes a perfectly competitive labor market, helps 
us to consider that the workers who are not employed in these firms get alternative 
jobs at the same wage rate. Hence, this assumption helps us to eliminate the negative 
employment effects of outsourcing in our analysis. It should be noted that it is not our 
intention to deny the importance of the employment and the quality effects of 
outsourcing. Rather, by eliminating these effects from our analysis, we can focus only 
on the competition effect, which is the purpose of this paper. 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that the entry-deterrence role of outsourcing by firm 1 remains even if lower 
efficiency of firm 2 creates a higher marginal cost of firm 2 (compared to firm 1), instead of a higher 
fixed cost of outsourcing for firm 2.    5
We consider the following three-stage game. At stage 1, the outsourcing 
decision is taken. At stage 2, firm 2 decides whether to enter or not. At stage 3, the 
outputs are determined and the profits are realized. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
 
2.1. No outsourcing 
Let us first consider the situation with no outsourcing at stage 1. If entry occurs at 
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2 π .    (3) 
It follows, from (3), that if firm 1 does not outsource, firm 2 enters the market 
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, firm 2 does not enter the market even if firm 1 does 







c a ne no −
= π .         ( 5 )  
Under no outsourcing by firm 1, welfare of the domestic country, which is the 
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2.2. Outsourcing 
Now consider outsourcing by firm 1, at stage 1. If entry occurs at stage 2, the 















= .       ( 7 )  
We assume that 
2
a
c < , which ensures positive output of firm 2 if it enters 
under outsourcing by firm 1. The equilibrium profit of firm 2 is 
   E







2 π .         ( 8 )  
It is immediate from (8) that if firm 1 does outsourcing, firm 2 enters the 








.        ( 9 )  
 
Proposition 1: Outsourcing (compared to no outsourcing) by firm 1 reduces firm 2’s 
incentive for market-entry. 
Proof: A comparison of Equations (4) and (9) proves the result.                 Q. E. D. 
 
  Intuitively, outsourcing increases the cost efficiency of firm 1, thus reducing 
the competitiveness of firm 2, and creating lower incentive for entry by firm 2. 







, firm 2 enters the market 
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E , firm 2   7






> , firm 2 never 
enters regardless of firm 1’s outsourcing decision. 
  It may worth mentioning that if firm 2 is symmetric to firm 1 with respect to 
outsourcing, i.e., getting the same benefit from outsourcing and incurring the same 
cost of outsourcing, it is easy to check that, in our analysis, outsourcing by firm 1 
does not prevent entry of firm 2 whenever entry by firm 2 is profitable under no 
outsourcing by firm 1. Hence, the asymmetry between the firms with respect to 
outsourcing is crucial for the above result. 
  So far we did not determine the price of outsourcing, which will have 
significant implications for the domestic welfare. It is important to note that the price 
of outsourcing depends both on the entry decision of firm 2 and on the profit of firm 1 
under no outsourcing, since both the factors affect the disagreement payoff of firm 1. 
Let us first consider the situation where firm 2 enters the market under 







. In this situation, the price of outsourcing,F , is 
chosen to maximize the following expression:  


























2 c a +
 is the profit of firm 1 under outsourcing, and 
9
) (
2 c a −
 is the profit of 
firm 1 under no outsourcing. 
The optimal value of F  is 
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Welfare of the domestic country under outsourcing by firm 1 and entry by firm 2 is  
  E
c a c a ac c a
W
e e o −
− + − + + −
=
18
) 2 ( ) 2 ( 2 8 ) ( 2
2 2 2
/ , α
.                        (13) 












2 2 c a c a
E , which suggests that firm 
2 does not enter the market if firm 1 outsources. Therefore, firm 1 produces as a 
monopolist under outsourcing, and the profit of firm 1 is 
4
2 a
. However, note that firm 
2 enters the market under no outsourcing by firm 1. Hence, under no outsourcing by 
firm 1, the profit of firm 1 is 
9
) (
2 c a −
. Hence, we determine F  by solving the 






















F  .                              (14) 
The optimal value of F  is  












* c a a
F α .                               (15) 
The profit of firm 1 under outsourcing is 
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α π .       (16) 
Welfare of the domestic country under outsourcing by firm 1 is 
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> , where entry does not occur 
regardless of the outsourcing decision of firm 1. In this situation, firm 1 becomes 
monopoly under both outsourcing and no outsourcing, and its profits under 
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. Hence, F  






















F  .                              (18) 
The optimal value of F  is  
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F α .                               (19) 
The profit of firm 1 under outsourcing is 
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α π .                     (20) 
Welfare of the domestic country under outsourcing by firm 1 is 
 
8
) 2 ( 2 ) ( 2
2 2
/ , a c a c c a
W
ne ne o + − + −
=
α
.                                                (21) 
 
3. The main Results 
The results shown below in Proposition 2 follow immediately from (11), (12), (15), 
(16), (19) and (20). 
 
Proposition 2: (i) The profit of the input supplier in the foreign country is highest if 
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The intuition for the above result is as follows. The input supplier’s profit 
depends on the surplus created by outsourcing, and this surplus and, thus, the input 
supplier’s profit, is maximal when entry occurs only under no outsourcing. If entry 
occurs only under no outsourcing, it helps to create maximal surplus under 
outsourcing by reducing firm 1’s profit under no outsourcing and by creating 
maximum gross profit under outsourcing. Hence, this situation generates the highest 
price for outsourcing, which is the profit of the input supplier. However, the profit of 
firm 1 under outsourcing is the profit in the product-market net of the price paid for 
outsourcing, and this is maximized if entry of firm 2 does not occur irrespective of 
outsourcing by firm 1. The profit in the product-market under outsourcing is 
maximized if entry of firm 2 is deterred under outsourcing. Even if the minimum 
price paid by firm 1 may occur either under ‘never entry by firm 2’ or under ‘always 
entry by firm 2’, the higher market concentration under the former situation always 
creates higher net profit for firm 1. 
 












2 2 c a c a
E .  
(i) If  1 = α , domestic welfare is higher under outsourcing even if outsourcing 
prevents entry of firm 2.   11
(ii) If  0 = α  and 
4
) 4 30 ( * −
≡ >
a
c c , domestic welfare is higher under outsourcing 
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2 2 c a c a
E , firm 2 enters only under no outsourcing by firm 
1. In this situation, welfare of the domestic country is given by (6a) and (17) for no 
outsourcing and for outsourcing by firm 1, respectively. A comparison of (6a) and 
(17) shows that welfare is higher under no outsourcing if 
  E
a c a c a c a
>
− + − − −
72
9 ) 2 )( 2 5 ( 2 ) ( 24
2 2 α
.                            (22) 
Note that the left hand side (LHS) of (22) is an increasing function of E . Hence, if 








≡ , since (22) boils down 
to 
0 32 3
2 > − − ac a ,                 (22a) 
which never holds. This proves part (i). 








≡  if 
0 16 8 7
2 2 < − − ac c a  
or    
4
) 4 30 ( * −
≡ >
a
c c .                 (22b) 
This proves part (ii).                            Q.E.D. 
 
Since LHS of (22) is a decreasing function of α , Corollary 1 follows 
immediately from Proposition 3 and shows the main result of the paper. 
   12
Corollary 1: If both α  and c are sufficiently small, outsourcing reduces domestic 
welfare if it deters market-entry by firm 2. 
  
The intuition for the above result is as follows. On one hand, if α  and c are 
sufficiently small, firm 1’s profit extraction from outsourcing and the cost saving 
from outsourcing are both small. Hence, the positive effect of outsourcing on 
domestic welfare due to the higher domestic profit is not very strong. On the other 
hand, outsourcing eliminates entry, thus creating higher product-market 
concentration, which affects consumer surplus negatively. On the balance, the loss of 
consumer surplus dominates the profit-gain from outsourcing, thus creating lower 
domestic welfare under outsourcing compared to no outsourcing. Note that even if 
outsourcing helps to save the entry cost, the higher market concentration may become 
the dominant factor to create lower domestic welfare under outsourcing compared to 
no outsourcing. 
  It may worth mentioning that Corollary 1 holds even if firm 1 and the foreign 








≡ = , 
condition (22) becomes  0 12 2
2 2 > − − ac c a , which holds for 
2




  Proposition 3 explores the situation where international outsourcing prevents 
domestic entry. However, if firm 2’s entry decision is not affected by outsourcing by 
firm 1, i.e., if firm 2 either enters or does not enter irrespective of outsourcing by firm 
1, outsourcing always increases domestic welfare compared to no outsourcing. 
  It is worth pointing out that the consumption of entire outputs in the domestic 
country may not be important for our qualitative result. If the outputs are sold in the 
world market and only a fraction of the total output is sold in the domestic country,   13
the negative impact of outsourcing on domestic welfare due to entry deterrence is 
reduced, yet domestic welfare may be lower under outsourcing than under no 
outsourcing. For example, in the extreme situation where no outputs are sold in the 








which is greater than the domestic welfare under outsourcing, which tends to 
9
) (
2 c a −
. If the bargaining power of firm 1 is sufficiently small, outsourcing by firm 
1 creates lower domestic welfare under outsourcing compared to no outsourcing by 
reducing the total domestic profit under the former situation compared to the latter. 
  As final remark, we would like to mention that, we consider a duopoly market 
structure to show our results in the simplest way. However, it is easy to understand 
that our qualitative results hold even if there are multiple incumbents and multiple 
entrants, where outsourcing is not an economically viable option to some of the 
entrants. Outsourcing by some firms may deter entry by the non-outsourcing entrants 
by reducing their competitiveness, and may, in turn, reduce domestic welfare by 
increasing market concentration.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The job loss created by international outsourcing has been a major concern in the 
policy circle, though empirical findings do not always support this view. We have 
identified competition effect as an alternative source leading towards a grave policy 
concern over international outsourcing. We show that international outsourcing may 
create lower domestic welfare by affecting the product-market structure. In particular, 
if the firms are asymmetric in terms of the economic viability of international 
outsourcing, outsourcing (as compared to no outsourcing) may reduce domestic   14
welfare by deterring entry in the domestic country. Hence, the effects on market 
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